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INTRODUCTION:
PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT
AND THE CONSENT DILEMMA
Daniel J. Solove∗
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, the problems involving information privacy — the ascendance of Big Data and fusion centers, the tsunami of
data security breaches, the rise of Web 2.0, the growth of behavioral
marketing, and the proliferation of tracking technologies — have become thornier. Policymakers have proposed and passed significant
new regulation in the United States and abroad, yet the basic approach
to protecting privacy has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s.
Under the current approach, the law provides people with a set of
rights to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their
data. These rights consist primarily of rights to notice, access, and
consent regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data.
The goal of this bundle of rights is to provide people with control over
their personal data, and through this control people can decide for
themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use,
or disclosure of their information. I will refer to this approach to privacy regulation as “privacy self-management.”
Privacy self-management takes refuge in consent. It attempts to be
neutral about substance — whether certain forms of collecting, using,
or disclosing personal data are good or bad — and instead focuses on
whether people consent to various privacy practices. Consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data.
Although privacy self-management is certainly a laudable and necessary component of any regulatory regime, I contend that it is being
tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities.
Privacy selfmanagement does not provide people with meaningful control over
their data. First, empirical and social science research demonstrates
that there are severe cognitive problems that undermine privacy selfmanagement. These cognitive problems impair individuals’ ability to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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make informed, rational choices about the costs and benefits of consenting to the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal data.
Second, and more troubling, even well-informed and rational individuals cannot appropriately self-manage their privacy due to several
structural problems. There are too many entities collecting and using
personal data to make it feasible for people to manage their privacy
separately with each entity. Moreover, many privacy harms are the
result of an aggregation of pieces of data over a period of time by different entities. It is virtually impossible for people to weigh the costs
and benefits of revealing information or permitting its use or transfer
without an understanding of the potential downstream uses, further
limiting the effectiveness of the privacy self-management framework.
In addition, privacy self-management addresses privacy in a series
of isolated transactions guided by particular individuals. Privacy costs
and benefits, however, are more appropriately assessed cumulatively
and holistically — not merely at the individual level. As several Articles in this Symposium demonstrate, privacy has an enormous social
impact. Professor Neil Richards argues that privacy safeguards intellectual pursuits, and that there is a larger social value to ensuring robust and uninhibited reading, speaking, and exploration of ideas.1
Professor Julie Cohen argues that innovation depends upon privacy,
which is increasingly under threat as Big Data mines information
about individuals and as media-content providers track people’s consumption of ideas through technology.2 Moreover, in a number of
cases, as Professor Lior Strahilevitz contends, privacy protection has
distributive effects; it benefits some people and harms other people.3
Privacy thus does more than just protect individuals. It fosters a certain kind of society, since people’s decisions about their own privacy
affect society, not just themselves. Because individual decisions to
consent to data collection, use, or disclosure might not collectively
yield the most desirable social outcome, privacy self-management often
fails to address these larger social values.
With each sign of failure of privacy self-management, however, the
typical response by policymakers, scholars, and others is to call for
more and improved privacy self-management. In this Article, I argue
that in order to advance, privacy law and policy must face the problems with privacy self-management and start forging a new direction.
Any solution must confront a complex dilemma with consent.
Consent to collection, use, and disclosure of personal data is often
not meaningful, but the most apparent solution — paternalistic
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1945–52 (2013).
See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–27 (2013).
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2010 (2013).
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measures — even more directly denies people the freedom to make
consensual choices about their data. Paternalism would be easy to justify if many uses of data had little benefit or were primarily detrimental to the individual or society. But many uses of data have benefits in addition to costs, and individuals could rationally reach opposite
conclusions regarding whether the benefits outweigh the costs. Making the choice for individuals restrains their ability to consent. Thus,
to the extent that legal solutions follow a path away from privacy selfmanagement and toward paternalism, they are likely to limit consent.
A way out of this dilemma remains elusive.
Until privacy law recognizes the true depth of the difficulties of
privacy self-management and confronts the consent dilemma, privacy
law will not be able to progress much further. In this Article, I will
propose several ways privacy law can grapple with the consent dilemma and move beyond relying too heavily on privacy self-management.
I. PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT
Privacy self-management has its origins in the Fair Information
Practices, which are also commonly referred to as the Fair Information
Practice Principles (FIPPs).4 The FIPPs officially appeared in a 1973
report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) to address concerns about the increasing digitization of data.
The principles included (1) transparency of record systems of personal
data, (2) the right to notice about such record systems, (3) the right to
prevent personal data from being used for new purposes without consent, (4) the right to correct or amend one’s records, and (5) responsibilities on the holders of data to prevent its misuse.5 These principles
were embodied selectively in various statutes in the United States, and
they helped shape the OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980 and the
APEC Privacy Framework of 2004.6
Nearly all instantiations of the FIPPs fail to specify what data may
be collected or how it may be used. Instead, most forms of data collection, use, and disclosure are permissible under the FIPPs if individuals
have the ability to self-manage their privacy — that is, if they are notified and provide consent.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4 See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, BOB GELLMAN 9–10
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPPShistory.pdf.
5 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41–
42 (1973).
6 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980); ASIAPAC. ECON. COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2004); Gellman, supra note 4, at 7.
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Privacy self-management is so widely accepted that even deep
disputes about privacy protection turn on different interpretations and
applications of it. In 2012, for example, both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the White House, dissatisfied with the current regulatory approach, issued major new frameworks for protecting privacy.
At the foundation of both, however, is the same old privacy selfmanagement model. The FTC framework aims to “[m]ake information collection and use practices transparent” and to provide people
with “the ability to make decisions about their data at a relevant time
and context.”7 A centerpiece of the White House’s proposed Consumer Bill of Rights is the right of consumers to exercise “appropriate control” over their personal data and to have “clear and simple choices,
presented at times and in ways that enable consumers to make meaningful decisions about personal data collection, use, and disclosure.”8
As I will argue in this Part, however, privacy self-management
faces several problems that together demonstrate that this paradigm
alone cannot serve as the centerpiece of a viable privacy regulatory regime. I will discuss two broad types of problems: (1) cognitive problems, which concern challenges caused by the way humans make decisions, and (2) structural problems, which concern challenges arising
from how privacy decisions are designed.
A. Cognitive Problems
A number of cognitive problems plague privacy self-management.
Privacy self-management envisions an informed and rational person
who makes appropriate decisions about whether to consent to various
forms of collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. But empirical
evidence and social science literature demonstrate that people’s actual
ability to make such informed and rational decisions does not even
come close to the vision contemplated by privacy self-management.
1. The Problem of the Uninformed Individual. — Two of the most
important components of privacy self-management are informing individuals about the data collected and used about them (notice) and allowing them to decide whether they accept such collection and uses
(choice). These components of the FIPPs are widely embraced in the
United States,9 an approach termed “notice and choice.” Entities have
normalized the practice of providing notice and choice by offering pri–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE, at i (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
8 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 47 (2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
9 See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Conference of Western Attorneys
General Annual Meeting, Privacy 3.0 Panel (July 20, 2010).
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vacy notices and a choice to opt out of some of the forms of data collection and use described in the notices.
The FTC has stepped in to serve as an enforcer of privacy notices.
Since 1998, the FTC has maintained that breaking promises made in a
privacy notice constitutes “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce” in violation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.10 When it finds such a violation, the FTC can bring civil actions
and seek injunctive remedies.11 The notice and choice approach has
also been a centerpiece of privacy legislation. The Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA),12 for example, requires financial institutions to
provide customers with privacy notices and to allow customers to opt
out of data sharing with third parties.13
Despite the embrace of notice and choice, people do not seem to be
engaging in much privacy self-management. Most people do not read
privacy notices on a regular basis.14 As for other types of notices, such
as end-user license agreements and contract boilerplate terms, studies
show only a miniscule percentage of people read them.15 Moreover,
few people opt out of the collection, use, or disclosure of their data
when presented with the choice to do so.16 Most people do not even
bother to change the default privacy settings on websites.17 As FTC
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). For background about the FTC’s enforcement regarding privacy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 820–31 (4th
ed. 2011).
11 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m).
12 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C).
13 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)–(b) (2006).
14 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 105 (2010) (discussing a 2006 study
showing that only 20% of people read privacy notices “most of the time” (quoting TRUSTe &
TNS, Consumers Have a False Sense of Security About Online Privacy: Actions Inconsistent with
Attitudes, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/consumers-have-false-sense
-of-security-about-online-privacy---actions-inconsistent-with-attitudes-55969467.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343, 361–62 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); George R. Milne & Mary J.
Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read)
Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 20–21 (2004) (finding that only
4.5% of respondents said they always read website privacy notices and 14.1% frequently
read them).
15 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–78 (2011); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?
Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 178 (2011) (discussing a study that revealed that people accessed contract
boilerplate terms far less than 1% of the time).
16 See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2002) (stating that according
to one survey, “only 0.5% of banking customers had exercised their opt-out rights”).
17 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us
About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY 363, 369 (Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, Costas
Lambrinoudakis & Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati eds., 2008).
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Chairman Jon Leibowitz has concluded: “Initially, privacy policies
seemed like a good idea. But in practice, they often leave a lot to be
desired. In many cases, consumers don’t notice, read, or understand
the privacy policies.”18
Why are so few people engaging in privacy self-management? One
possible explanation is that privacy notices are long and difficult to
comprehend.19 There have been many proposals to shorten and simplify privacy policies, though these types of measures have not been
shown to significantly improve comprehension.20 For example, Professor M. Ryan Calo suggests that “visceral notice” may resuscitate the
notice approach by attempting to make people experience notice more
directly and emotionally.21 As an example, Calo references the FDA’s
effort to require graphic warnings, including images of death, on cigarettes.22 While smoking warnings may be effective because cancer and
death are such concrete and terrible consequences, privacy warnings
are more difficult to translate into visceral terms because the consequences are much more abstract.
There is a more difficult problem with proposals for improved notice, whether simplified or more visceral. Such proposals neglect a
fundamental dilemma of notice: making it simple and easy to understand conflicts with fully informing people about the consequences of
giving up data, which are quite complex if explained in sufficient detail to be meaningful. People need a deeper understanding and background to make informed choices. Many privacy notices, however, are
vague about future uses of data.
Moreover, as Strahilevitz notes in this Symposium, privacy choices
are often binary, such as with the Do Not Call Registry that allows
people to choose whether to opt out of telemarketing solutions.23 Many
people might desire more granularity in their choices, but additional
granularity adds complexity and creates greater risks of confusion.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, So Private, So Public: Individuals, the Internet & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing, Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, & Technology (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071031ehavior.pdf.
19 See Annie I. Anton et al., Financial Privacy Policies and the Need for Standardization, 2
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 36, 42–44 (2004); Janger & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1230–32;
Erik Sherman, Privacy Policies Are Great — For PhDs, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4, 2008, 5:31 AM),
http://industry.bnet.com/technology/1000391/privacypolicies-are-great-for-phds.
20 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2012) (“Studies show only marginal improvement in consumer understanding where privacy policies get expressed as tables, icons, or labels, assuming the consumer
even reads them.”).
21 See id. at 1034–35.
22 Id. at 1069–70.
23 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 2038.
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Compounding the difficulties in providing notice and choice is the
fact that people operate under woefully incorrect assumptions about
how their privacy is protected. One study found that people correctly
answered only 30% of questions regarding the privacy of their online
transactions.24 Another study found that “64% [of the people surveyed] do not know that a supermarket is allowed to sell other companies information about what they buy” and that 75% falsely believe
that when “a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not
share my information with other websites and companies.”25
Thus far, in most situations, people do not engage in privacy selfmanagement. The evidence suggests that people are not well informed
about privacy. Efforts to improve education are certainly laudable, as
are attempts to make privacy notices more understandable. But such
efforts fail to address a deeper problem — privacy is quite complicated. This fact leads to a tradeoff between providing a meaningful notice and providing a short and simple one.
2. The Problem of Skewed Decisionmaking. — Even if most people
were to read privacy policies routinely, people often lack enough expertise to adequately assess the consequences of agreeing to certain present uses or disclosures of their data. People routinely turn over their
data for very small benefits.26 Some conclude from this fact that consumers do not value privacy highly.27 Some have suggested that there
might be a generational shift in privacy norms, where young people do
not care about privacy.28 But in surveys, people routinely declare how
much they care about privacy, and attitudes about privacy among the
young and old are, surprisingly, quite similar.29
There is a clear disconnect between people’s expressed high value
of privacy and their behavior, which indicates a very low value of privacy. Does this mean people actually do not care about privacy?
Social science literature indicates that this disconnect stems from certain impediments to rational decisionmaking.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24 Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 20–21 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/paper=1478214.
25 Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman & Kimberly Meltzer, OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICAN
SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE (Univ. of Pa., Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. 2005), available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/downloads/information_and_society/turow_appc_report
_web_final.pdf.
26 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in PRIVACY
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 15, 16 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu
eds., 2006).
27 See Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 42.
28 See Emily Nussbaum, My So-Called Blog, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004 § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 34.
29 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When
It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies? (Aug. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864.
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Work in social science — which I will define broadly to encompass
behavioral economics, psychology, and empirical studies in other
fields — shows that so many of our cherished assumptions about the
way people make decisions regarding privacy are false. As Professors
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein note, the “false assumption is that
almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their
best interest or at the very least are better than the choices that would
be made by someone else.”30 Studies by Professor Daniel Kahneman,
Professor Amos Tversky, and others demonstrate the falsity of the traditional rational agent model of human decisionmaking, as people
often decide based on heuristics and the way choices are framed.31
People have “bounded rationality” — they struggle to apply their
knowledge to complex situations — with regard to privacy.32 As Professors Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags observe, “our innate
bounded rationality limits our ability to acquire, memorize, and process all relevant information, and it makes us rely on simplified mental
models, approximate strategies, and heuristics.”33 Risk assessment is
also skewed by the “availability heuristic,” where people assess familiar
dangers as riskier than unfamiliar ones.34
Social science also reveals that privacy preferences are not developed in the abstract but in context. The way choices are framed, and
many other factors, shape — and tend to skew — privacy preferences.35 People are also more willing to share personal data when they
feel in control, regardless of whether that control is real or illusory.
More generally, “people are more willing to take risks, and judge those
risks as less severe, when they feel in control.”36
People may also tend to make certain mistakes in judgment consistently.37 At this point in time, companies, politicians, and others
seeking to influence choices are only beginning to tap into the insights
from social science literature, and they primarily still use rather anecdotal and unscientific means of persuasion. When those seeking to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
30
31

RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 9 (2008).
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 411 (2011). See generally CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982).
32 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 26, at 25–26.
33 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 17, at 369.
34 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 25.
35 Leslie K. John et al., The Best of Strangers: Context Dependent Willingness to Divulge Personal Information (July 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1430482.
36 Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, Misplaced Confidences:
Privacy and the Control Paradox, SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-SPPS.pdf.
37 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 240–41 (2008).
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shape decisions hone their techniques based on these social science insights (ironically enabled by access to ever-increasing amounts of data
about individuals and their behavior), people’s choices may be more
controlled than ever before (and also ironically, such choices can be
structured to make people believe that they are in control).
The upshot of this problem is that privacy decisions are particularly
susceptible to problems such as bounded rationality, the availability
heuristic, and framing effects because privacy is so complex, contextual,
and difficult to conceptualize.
* * *
The cognitive problems above thus present numerous hurdles for
privacy self-management: (1) people do not read privacy policies; (2) if
people read them, they do not understand them; (3) if people read and
understand them, they often lack enough background knowledge to
make an informed choice; and (4) if people read them, understand
them, and can make an informed choice, their choice might be skewed
by various decisionmaking difficulties. The situation nearly approaches that faced by the protagonist in Franz Kafka’s parable Before the
Law where the gateway was guarded by an infinite set of doorkeepers,
each more powerful than the next.38
B. Structural Problems
Even assuming that people are fully informed and rational, that
there is a way to protect their decisions from being skewed, and that
there is a way to capture their preferences accurately, privacy selfmanagement also faces serious structural problems. These structural
problems involve impediments to one’s ability to adequately assess the
costs and benefits of consenting to various forms of collection, use, and
disclosure of personal data. Structuring meaningful privacy decisions
proves to be an immensely difficult endeavor.
1. The Problem of Scale. — A person may be able to manage her
privacy with a few entities, but privacy self-management does not
scale well. Even if every entity provided people with an easy and
clear way to manage their privacy, there are simply too many entities
that collect, use, and disclose people’s data for the rational person to
handle. In particular, the average American visits nearly a hundred
websites per month and does business online and offline with countless
companies (merchant, utility, insurance, technology, travel, financial,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
38

FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 215 (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998) (1925).
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etc.).39 Not only will people struggle to manage privacy with the entities they know about, but there are also scores of entities that traffic in
personal data without people ever being aware. People cannot manage
their privacy with regard to these extensive “reservoirs” of data unless
they know these reservoirs exist and can identify the various entities
that maintain them.40
The problem is reminiscent of the beleaguered student whose professors collectively assign too much reading each night. From the perspective of each professor, the reading is a reasonable amount for an
evening. But when five or six simultaneously assign a night’s worth of
reading, the amount collectively becomes far too much. Thus, even if
all companies provided notice and adequate choices, this data management problem would persist; the average person just does not have
enough time or resources to manage all the entities that hold her data.
One study estimated it would cost $781 billion in lost productivity if
everyone were to read every privacy policy at websites they visited in
a one-year period.41 And many entities frequently modify their privacy policies, so reading them all just once is not enough. The problem
exists with opt-out policies as well as with opt-in policies.
Many entities want to do the right thing and be open about their
privacy practices and how people’s data will be used. However, even
with simple, conspicuous, and understandable privacy policies, the
problem of scale persists.
2. The Problem of Aggregation. — Another problem is that even if
people made rational decisions about sharing individual pieces of data
in isolation, they greatly struggle to factor in how their data might be
aggregated in the future. Suppose a person gives out an innocuous
piece of data at one point in time, thinking that he or she is not revealing anything sensitive. At other points in time, the person reveals
equally nonsensitive data. Unexpectedly, this data might be combined
and analyzed to reveal sensitive facts about the person. The person
never disclosed these facts nor anticipated that they would be uncovered. The problem was that the person gave away too many clues.
Modern data analytics, which is also loosely referred to as data mining
or “Big Data,” can deduce extensive information about a person from

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 See August 2011 — Top US Web Brands, NIELSEN WIRE (Sept. 30, 2011), http://blog
.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/august-2011-top-us-web-brands/.
40 See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law
at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243–51 (2007).
41 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.
L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 564 (2008).
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these clues. In other words, little bits of innocuous data can say a lot
in combination.42 I have referred to this as the “aggregation effect.”43
The difficulty with the aggregation effect is that it makes it nearly
impossible to manage data. The types of new information that can be
gleaned from analyzing existing information and the kinds of predictions that can be made from this data are far too vast and complex,
and are evolving too quickly, for people to fully assess the risks and
benefits involved. This state of affairs makes it very hard to assess
whether revealing any piece of information will sometime later on,
when combined with other data, reveal something sensitive.
The costs and benefits of each situation depend on the collective set
of previous disclosure decisions. At Time 1, it might make sense for a
person to reveal Fact 1. At Time 2, the person might decide to reveal
Fact 2. What is hard to determine is whether at Time 3 Facts 1 and 2
might be combined to reveal Fact 3, and whether the person would be
harmed by the knowledge or use of Fact 3. But at the time of revealing Fact 1 and Fact 2, the person might have no idea that Fact 1 plus
Fact 2 would yield Fact 3.
In the real world, we do not have just a few facts, but thousands of
pieces of data. Suppose that over the course of the past decade, a person gives out 50,000 pieces of data. The person has not been negatively affected by revealing these pieces of data. One day, the person reveals Fact 50,001, a relatively innocuous fact that gets combined with
some of the other facts the person provided many years ago to reveal
Fact 50,002. Deduced via a newly created algorithm, this fact proves
harmful to the person.
Of course, Fact 50,002 could turn out to be beneficial to the person
or to society as a whole — perhaps it reveals that the person is at risk
for contracting a highly contagious and lethal disease. The point is
that it is virtually impossible for a person to make meaningful judgments about the costs and benefits of revealing certain data. Therefore, in many situations, too much is unknown to make a meaningful
decision about costs and benefits at the time that people are asked to
manage their privacy.
To enable a person to make a rational decision about sharing data,
that person would need to have an understanding of the range of possible harms and benefits so as to do a cost-benefit analysis. Of course,
people make decisions in the face of uncertainty all the time, but they
often do so quite badly. As psychologist Daniel Gilbert has noted,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42 In addition to learning new information by combining bits and pieces of old information,
data analytics can make predictions about future behavior. Big Data might know something
about people even before they know it themselves.
43 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 44–47 (2004).
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people’s predictions about how various events will affect their future
happiness are remarkably inaccurate.44
Another challenge is that aggregation alters the identifiability of
other data. Privacy regulation is typically triggered by the presence of
“personally identifiable information” (PII) — defined roughly as information that is identifiable to an individual. Privacy laws typically
regulate only when PII is involved.45 One problem with PII is that, as
discussed above, it is not static: the identifiability of data depends
upon context.46 A search query, for example, is often not inherently
identifiable. Its identifiability depends upon the existing data available online. Such was the case with the famous anonymized search results AOL released, leading to a reporter’s identifying a person based
on her search queries.47 As data gets aggregated, information that is
not identifiable can become identified.
3. The Problem of Assessing Harm. — Compounding these problems is the fact that people often favor immediate benefits even when
there may be future detriments.48 The aggregation effect shows that
privacy is an issue of long-term information management, while most
decisions to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of data are tied
to a short-term benefit.
Privacy self-management asks people to assess the potential harm
to themselves early on, typically when the data is initially collected.
However, for a number of reasons, people will find it immensely challenging to engage in this cost-benefit analysis. First, as already discussed, many privacy harms are cumulative in nature: people may
agree to many forms of data collection, use, and disclosure over a long
period of time, and the harmful effects may only emerge from the
downstream uses of the combination of the data.
Individual privacy harms, meanwhile, are often small and dispersed. Of course, revealing nude photographs or highly embarrassing
or discreditable facts can generate substantial emotional distress. But
many privacy violations are akin to a bee sting. Despite this fact, it
would be wrong to conclude that they ought to be ignored. One bee
sting can be shrugged off, but a hundred or a thousand can be lethal.
Harm from privacy violations can develop gradually over time, but
decisions about privacy must be made individually, in isolation, and
far in advance.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 24–25 (2006).
See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011).
46 See supra p. 1890.
47 Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1.
48 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 17, at 372.
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Additionally, privacy self-management fails to account for the social impacts of individual privacy decisions. Individual privacy has a
variety of social functions. Several scholars have recognized that privacy is “constitutive” of society.49 Professor Priscilla Regan demonstrates the need for understanding privacy in terms of its social benefits.50 Professor Joel Reidenberg contends that “[s]ociety as a whole
has an important stake in the contours of the protection of personal
information.”51 Professor Spiros Simitis recognizes that “privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”52 Then-Professor Robert
Post asserts that privacy protection “safeguards rules of civility that in
some significant measure constitute both individuals and community.”53 Professor Paul Schwartz has further developed the theory of
constitutive privacy in arguing for privacy’s importance to civil society.54 Schwartz focuses on how the protection of information privacy
will further self-governance and democracy on the Internet.55
According to Cohen, privacy protection “preserves a zone of informational autonomy for individuals.”56 Privacy is essential not just to
our individual development but also to our cultural development. Our
intellectual development depends upon the creativity of others, and
our creativity in turn shapes their intellectual growth. These forces
interact to develop a rich culture. Stunting individual creativity and
intellectual development impoverishes society at large.57
Richards’s concept of “intellectual privacy” also recognizes the
broader social importance of privacy.58 Richards contends that “new
ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of public exposure” and that privacy is essential to promoting intellectual freedom.59
He also argues that intellectual privacy “should be preserved against

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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E.g., Janger & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1247.
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 212–14 (1995).
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 882–83
(2003).
52 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 709
(1987).
53 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989).
54 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1613
(1999).
55 Id. at 1613–14.
56 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1428 (2000).
57 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 1918.
58 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).
59 Richards, supra note 1, at 1946.
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private actors as well as against the state” because “[w]e are constrained
in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the state.”60
Privacy self-management cedes substantial responsibility for preserving privacy to individuals, and it assumes that the primary harm
to be redressed is nonconsensual data collection, use, or disclosure.
Although impinging upon consent constitutes harm worthy of redress,
the collective actions of people regarding privacy can implicate larger
social values. Privacy self-management does not prevent, redress, or
even consider infringements on those social values.
There is a countervailing social value in certain uses of data, such
as research uses, which might justify overriding individual decisions.
As Schwartz and I document elsewhere, data analytics have led to new
and improved medical treatments, as well as more effective responses
to data security breaches.61 There are thus social values both in favor
of and against privacy that are not adequately reflected in privacy selfmanagement, which focuses too exclusively on individual choice.
***
Privacy self-management often asks people to make decisions at an
early point in time (when information is collected) and at a series of
isolated instances. But the true consequences of information use for
individuals cannot be known when they make these decisions. Furthermore, the consequences are cumulative, and they cannot be adequately assessed in a series of isolated transactions. Privacy selfmanagement’s very structure impedes its ability to achieve its goal of
giving people meaningful control over their data. Moreover, its
narrow focus on individuals neglects the larger social dimensions
of privacy.
II. BEYOND PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT
Where should privacy law go from here? Clinging more tightly to
privacy self-management is not the answer. Nor is abandoning privacy self-management or embracing paternalistic regulation. In this
Part, I propose some guidance for privacy law’s future direction. Although I am far from ready to propose a complete solution, I can with
reasonable confidence point out paths that will prove fruitful and
paths that will not.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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A. Navigating the Consent Dilemma
Through privacy self-management, the law aims to give people
control over their data. The core of this control involves people’s
choices about whether to consent to data collection, use, and disclosure. As I demonstrated above, people are not able to provide meaningful consent in many situations.
The most obvious alternative would be for the law to regulate and
compel certain privacy choices. Privacy regulation, however, risks becoming too paternalistic. Regulation that sidesteps consent denies
people the freedom to make choices. The end result is that either
people have choices that are not meaningful or people are denied
choices altogether. Ironically, paternalistic regulation might limit
people’s freedom to choose in the name of enhancing their autonomy.
I term this problem the “consent dilemma.” Privacy scholars must
identify a conception of consent that both protects privacy and
avoids paternalism.
1. Rethinking Consent and Paternalism. — Consent is an undertheorized concept that is crucial for privacy and many other areas of
law. Consent performs an enormous amount of work. Activities that
would otherwise be illegitimate are made legitimate by consent. For
example, a person can agree to maintain confidentiality of data as a
condition of employment. The person would ordinarily be free to
speak about the data under the First Amendment right to free speech
but has consented to waive this right.62 Indeed, many constitutional
rights can be waived with consent, including rights that implicate privacy, such as First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association, the Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment right to protection against
compelled self-incrimination,63 and the right to information privacy.64
In addition to waiving their constitutional rights, people can consent to
a wide array of other incursions on their privacy, such as monitoring of
their communications and drug testing.65
As I demonstrated earlier, individuals cannot adequately selfmanage their privacy, and consent is not meaningful in many contexts
involving privacy. The primary regulatory alternative, endorsed by
several scholars, is that the law should regulate privacy in a more pa–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1676 (2009).
63 See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801–02 (2003). Some
rights, however, cannot be relinquished with consent, such as the right to vote.
64 Solove & Richards, supra note 62, at 1653.
65 Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding that giving employees a choice between taking a drug test or being fired was sufficient to make the drug
tests consensual).
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ternalistic manner. For example, Professor Anita Allen contends that
privacy is a “‘foundational’ human good[],” one that is essential for a
free and democratic society.66 She argues that in certain instances,
privacy must be mandated: “[F]or the sake of foundational human
goods, liberal societies properly constrain both government coercion
and individual choice . . . .”67
Cohen criticizes viewing privacy as something that can always be
“traded off against other goods.”68 Under her view, individuals should
not be able to waive privacy in a number of circumstances. Waiving
privacy can lead to less creativity and impinge upon the development
of selfhood. In her contribution to this Symposium, Cohen contends
that privacy “is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political systems.”69 The implication is that the law must override
individual consent in certain instances.
The call for increased paternalism stems in part from the fact that
people appear to be sharing data with increasing frequency and magnitude. Most people are not opting out as companies gather and use
data. They are exposing the intimate minutiae of their lives on sites
like Facebook and Twitter. This increased sharing of data is not the
result of people’s pure preferences. Their exposure is, in part, a result
of the fact that many websites are designed to encourage exposure
while minimizing awareness of the risks. This problem is made even
more acute by the fact that many of the users of these sites are teenagers, whose ability to make decisions is not fully mature.
More broadly, because of the cognitive and structural problems
with privacy self-management, people consent to the collection, use,
and disclosure of their personal data when it is not in their self-interest
to do so. This tendency lends support to those arguing for paternalistic regulation.
Despite the manifold problems with privacy self-management,
there are two arguments that counsel against paternalism. First, the
correct choices regarding privacy and data use are not always clear.
For example, although extensive self-exposure can have disastrous
consequences, many people use social media successfully and productively. Suppose a person suffering from bulimia wants to share her
experiences and medical information with the world. She is willing to
suffer the loss of privacy because she finds sharing her experiences to
be cathartic and empowering. She also desires to help other people
suffering from the disorder, and doing so gives her a rewarding sense
of purpose. She writes passionately about herself, exposing details that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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could later be seen by employers or others, potentially resulting in a
loss of employment opportunities. Should the law forbid her from
sharing her story? If the law were to put restrictions on her disclosure,
then it would be limiting her freedom and autonomy — ironically in
the name of preserving her freedom and autonomy. A further problem
with the paternalistic approach is that the cost-benefit analysis, at least
in this hypothetical, does not clearly counsel against disclosure. In
fact, the benefits might far outweigh the costs. She might, for example, use her exposure to write a book launching a successful career as a
writer and as a crusader against bulimia.
Similarly, some people want targeted marketing. They want their
data shared. They want catalogs to be mailed to their homes. They
want to be tracked. They want to be profiled. They want companies
to use their personal information to recommend products and services.
These people should not be dismissed as uninformed or foolish, as it is
far from clear that the costs to these people outweigh the benefits.
Second, and more broadly, there are social benefits to data analysis.
As Professor Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky note, the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal data — even without consent — can lead to
great benefits for individuals and society.70 For example, many Internet companies that offer free web content use the analysis or sale of
personal data as the main source of revenue.71 If many people refuse
to consent to the use of the data, these business models will fail. Thus,
structurally, one of the benefits of data collection, use, and disclosure is
that it pays for online content. There are deep problems with this
state of affairs, as people are often not fully aware that they are paying
for online content with their personal data,72 but legal restrictions on
this business model would strike many as overly paternalistic.
In general, the law overrides people’s ability to consent when the
individual or social harms of what they might consent to clearly outweigh the benefits. The total social costs and benefits of an individual’s waiver of privacy rights are often complicated to weigh. As
Strahilevitz notes in this Symposium, various restrictions on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data lead to benefits for some
people and detriments to others.73 Privacy has distributive effects, and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–12). Schwartz
and I raise additional examples elsewhere. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 45, at 1866–68.
71 Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327,
1328–29 (2012).
72 See id.
73 Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 2022.
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this fact makes it more complicated to determine which choice is the
right one to make.74
The law generally does not override consent, even with potentially
dangerous activities. Individuals can consent to smoking cigarettes
and drinking alcohol, even though those activities are dangerous. The
same is true for playing football or engaging in careers such as coal
mining or firefighting. Other consensual activities are prohibited, such
as prostitution and certain drug use; these activities are seen as having
little social value. While these activities may not be distinguishable
from legal ones for more than historical and moral reasons, they are
among the small number of consensual activities that are forbidden by
law. The choice to surrender one’s privacy does not seem burdened by
the extreme moral or safety considerations inherent in the small group
of forbidden consensual activities.
As a general matter, the law refrains from restricting transactions
that appear on the surface to be consensual, and the law will tolerate a
substantial amount of manipulation and even coercion before it deems
a transaction to be nonconsensual. Contract law does not second-guess
every agreement, even lopsided ones where one party did not fare very
well. People make decisions all the time that are not in their best interests. People relinquish rights and take bad risks, and the law often
does not stop them.
The EU has a more paternalistic approach to data processing, as
Schwartz documents in this Symposium.75 EU privacy law has a selfmanagement component, but it requires a much more stringent and
explicit form of consent than U.S. privacy law.76 Moreover, EU law is
more restrictive of data collection, use, and disclosure — it requires
a legal basis before personal data can be processed, whereas in the
U.S. data can generally be processed “unless a law specifically forbids
the activity.”77
Despite these differences, the EU’s more explicit consent requirements do not necessarily lead to people engaging in more meaningful
cost-benefit analyses regarding the collection and uses of their data. In
the EU, consent is certainly more difficult and costly to obtain, sometimes so much so that it can impede beneficial information flow.
Moreover, EU regulation can be formalistic, and it often provides restrictions without any connection to harm. The regulation can thus
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU–U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1971–76, 1992–2001 (2013).
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hinder processing that does not cause harm and even might be beneficial. U.S. law, in contrast, generally allows the processing of data unless it causes a problem.78 The difficulty with the EU approach is that
data collection, use, and disclosure are rarely inherently good or bad.
The costs and benefits depend upon the consequences. Paternalism is
much easier to justify when the consequences are clearly bad.
2. The Failure of Opt-in Consent. — Some argue that the answer
to the many problems of consent is to move to a more explicit and affirmative method of procuring consent: an opt-in rather than opt-out
regime. As stated by FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, companies
should move to a model where consumers “‘opt in’ when it comes to
collecting information — especially when it comes to sharing consumer
information with third parties and sharing it across various webbased services.”79
Despite my early optimism about opt-in, I now believe it will fail.
One reason is that many organizations will have the sophistication and
motivation to find ways to generate high opt-in rates. They can
do so simply by conditioning products, services, or access on opting in.
As Schwartz has aptly noted, “many data-processing institutions are
likely to be good at obtaining consent on their terms regardless of
whether the default requires consumers to authorize or preclude
information-sharing.”80
Moreover, “consumers are likely to be far more sensitive to price
terms, such as the cost of a checking account, than to nonprice terms
like the financial institution’s privacy policies and practices.”81 Indeed, agreeing to clickwrap contracts and end-user license agreements
is often a prerequisite for obtaining access to a website or to use a
product or service. Consider the end-user license agreement to Apple’s
iTunes Store.82 Periodically, this agreement pops up and people are
required to agree. On an iPhone, the text of this agreement often extends to more than fifty screens. If people want to download apps
from the store, they have no choice but to agree. This requirement is
akin to an opt-in system — affirmative consent is being sought. But
hardly any bargaining or choosing occurs in this process. Thus, despite regulators’ best intentions, an opt-in system or a requirement of
affirmative consent for most new uses of data will likely lead to more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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buttons to click and more forms to sign, but not to more meaningful
privacy protection.
Requiring companies to obtain affirmative consent for many new
uses of data might also be unnecessarily costly and impede socially
beneficial uses.83 Making consent cumbersome and costly to procure
can have the de facto effect of restricting certain uses not because people will withhold consent, but because the costs of procuring consent
might prevent entities from engaging in those uses. The result might
be to restrict uses of data in a formalistic manner that fails to distinguish beneficial from harmful uses. Some might say that less data collection, use, and disclosure is always a victory, but should privacy win
out when the benefits of data uses outweigh the privacy costs? Or
when individuals would desire a use but are not asked because asking
would be too costly?
Some might support opt-in because consumers would be forced to
pay attention to notifications about how their data will be used and
disclosed, which people are less likely to know with an opt-out system.
Despite the knowledge benefit of opt-in, there is a cost. In opt-in regimes, people affirmatively indicate their consent to data collection
and sharing. With this clearer and more legitimate consent, companies
might feel more entitled to use and disclose data more widely. In contrast, with opt-out the consent procured is less legitimate than with
opt-in regimes. This disparity does not make opt-out consent illegitimate, but it is certainly ambiguous, as opt-out consent might be the
product of mere inertia or lack of awareness of the option to opt out.
In the long run, opting in may not even lead to fewer people sharing data. If companies must obtain opt-in consent, they might also be
more aggressive about the amount of data that they ask for.84 Data
collectors may attempt to define potential future uses more broadly
and vaguely in order to avoid having to obtain new consent in the future. In the end, opt-in is just another version of privacy selfmanagement, and it suffers from the same underlying problems.
3. Should Privacy Self-Management Be Abandoned? — For all its
flaws, privacy self-management should not be abandoned. Providing
people with notice, access, and the ability to control their data is key to
facilitating some autonomy in a world where decisions are increasingly
being made about them with the use of personal data, automated processes, and clandestine rationales, and where people have minimal
abilities to do anything about such decisions. A world without privacy
self-management would clearly be troublesome, as people should have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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rights to know about how their data is being used and to make decisions about those uses.
Moreover, efforts to improve privacy self-management through
more consumer education, more salient notices, and more choices are
certainly laudable and important. Such efforts have been a major legal and policy goal. In essence, this work is doubling down on selfmanagement.
Ironically, perhaps the greatest practical impact of privacy selfmanagement is not in informing individuals and improving their privacy management, but in informing the companies that are collecting
and using the data and in improving the companies’ management of
privacy.85 The process of creating privacy notices forces internal
changes within a company, raising self-awareness about data collection
and use. Chief Privacy Officers (CPOs) educate personnel to be mindful of privacy and influence software, product, and service design to be
more privacy friendly. Privacy self-management thus has the salutary
effect of creating beneficial structural privacy protections and accountability inside institutions.86
Privacy self-management should also not be abandoned because
there are times when people want to manage their privacy, and denying people this ability can disempower them and constrain their freedom. For example, some people take great care with the privacy
settings on their social media profile pages. Some want their profiles
exposed to the world. Some want their profiles exposed only to their
friends. People in each group might care a lot about their social media
privacy settings on one particular site yet not bother to look at the privacy policies at other sites they use.
Thus, privacy self-management should not be abandoned, and paternalistic solutions are troubling. There is no silver bullet, and so we
must continue to engage in an elaborate dance with the tension between self-management and paternalism.
B. Future Directions
Although we should not reject privacy self-management, it is currently asked to bear far more weight than it can support. So what can
be done?
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
85 See Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L.
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1. Rethinking Consent and Employing Nudges. — In order for privacy regulation to make headway, the law needs a better and more coherent approach to consent with respect to privacy. Indeed, in many
areas of law, consent plays a critical role, yet what constitutes valid
consent varies greatly across different areas of law. Thus far, few have
attempted to analyze systematically what consent entails and to develop a more coherent approach toward consent.
Currently, the law has not sufficiently grappled with the social science literature that has been teaching us about the complexities and
challenges involved in human decisionmaking. What does consenting
to something really mean? What should the law recognize as valid
consent? Many transactions occur with some kind of inequality in
knowledge and power. When are these asymmetries so substantial as
to be coercive? The law’s current view of consent is incoherent, and
the law treats consent as a simple binary (that is, it either exists or it
does not). Consent is far more nuanced, and privacy law needs a new
approach that accounts for the nuances without getting too complex to
be workable.
There are also promising ways to mix consent with paternalism.
For example, Thaler and Sunstein propose forms of “libertarian paternalism,” which they refer to as “nudges,” that seek to architect choices
so as to change “people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”87 Nudges are paternalistic, but not as restrictive and absolute
as more traditional paternalistic regulation. In some cases, nudges
might be a workable middle ground between privacy self-management
and paternalism.
2. Developing Partial Privacy Self-Management. — In essence,
what many people want when it comes to privacy is for their data to
be collected, used, and disclosed in ways that benefit them or that benefit society without harming them individually. If people have an objection to certain uses of data, they want a right to say no. But many
people do not want to micromanage their privacy. They want to know
that someone is looking out for their privacy and that they will be protected from harmful uses.
With the food we eat and the cars we drive, we have much choice
in the products we buy, and we trust that these products will fall within certain reasonable parameters of safety. We do not have to become
experts on cars or milk, and people do not necessarily want to become
experts on privacy either. Sometimes people want to manage their
privacy in a particular situation, and they should be able to do so. But
globally across all entities that gather data, people will likely find self–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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management to be a nearly impossible task. People want some privacy self-management, just not too much. Privacy law needs to find a
way to deliver partial privacy self-management.
One possible answer might be to find ways for people to manage
their privacy globally for all entities rather than one at a time. But
unifying such management can be challenging because it will be difficult to find a uniform set of privacy options that makes sense for all
entities, and the consequences of data collection, use, or disclosure
might differ depending upon which entities are involved.
3. Adjusting Privacy’s Timing and Focus. — Privacy law’s timing
needs to be adjusted. Privacy self-management and the law focus
heavily on the time of the initial collection of data — and often on
each individual transaction where data is exchanged. But it is very
difficult at the time of data collection for a person to make a sensible
judgment about the future privacy implications because the implications are often unknown.
Therefore, the focus should be more on downstream uses rather
than on the time of the initial collection of data. In many cases, benefits might not be apparent at the time the data is collected. New ideas
for combining data, new discoveries in data aggregation and analysis,
and new techniques and technologies of data analysis might change
the benefits side of the equation. They might change the costs side
as well. Rules that require renewed consent for new uses of data
might be too prohibitively costly and serve as a de facto bar on these
uses. Such an outcome might not be socially desirable, and it might
not be the outcome preferred by most people whose data is involved.
On the other hand, blanket consent that allows for a virtually unlimited array of new uses of data can be just as undesirable, as data can
potentially be used in harmful ways that people might not be able to
anticipate or understand.
Moreover, measuring the costs of certain forms of collection, use,
and disclosure of personal data is extremely difficult because privacy
harms are so elusive to define. Ultimately, because of the dynamism of
this area, assessing costs and benefits requires a fair degree of speculation about the future. Individuals are likely not able to make such decisions very well in advance, but neither is the law.
Such decisions would be better made at the time of particular uses
of data. What is needed is for the law to weigh in and provide guidance about the types of new uses at the time they are proposed. Perhaps some ought to be restricted outright, some ought to be limited,
some ought to require new consent, some ought to be permitted but
with a right to revoke consent, and some ought to be permitted without new consent. Perhaps an agency should review proposals for new
uses as they arise.
4. Moving Toward Substance over Neutrality. — Any way forward
will require the law to make difficult substantive decisions. Privacy
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self-management attempts to remain neutral about the merits of particular forms of data collection, use, or disclosure and looks merely to
whether or not there is consent. Under privacy self-management, most
forms of data collection, use, or disclosure are acceptable if consensual.
Consent often becomes a convenient way to reach outcomes without
confronting the central values at stake. To move forward, this kind of
neutrality cannot be sustained.
The law should develop and codify basic privacy norms. Such codification need not be overly paternalistic — it can be in a form like the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), where certain default rules can be
waived. The norms of the UCC have become well entrenched and oft
followed. Deviations from these norms are quite salient. Privacy law
has said far too little about the appropriate forms of collection, use,
and disclosure of data. I am not suggesting a paternalistic regime
where the law rigidly prohibits a wide array of data collection, use, or
disclosure; only on the outer boundaries should the law do so. But the
law must take a stronger stance about substance.
More substantive rules about data collection, use, and disclosure
could consist of hard boundaries that block particularly troublesome
practices as well as softer default rules that can be bargained around.
Default rules can be crafted in a manner that modulates the ease with
which parties can bargain around them. More substantive rules that
establish a basic set of norms about privacy will make it easier for
people to understand how their privacy is being protected. Deviations
from these norms will be more conspicuous. The cacophony of different approaches to privacy will be lessened.
CONCLUSION
For far too long, privacy law has been relying too heavily upon
privacy self-management. Privacy self-management cannot achieve
the goals demanded of it, and it has been pushed beyond its limits.
But privacy self-management should not be abandoned, and alternatives risk becoming too paternalistic.
At the core of many privacy issues is the consent dilemma, and too
often, law, policy, and scholarship ignore it. The way forward involves
(1) developing a coherent approach to consent, one that accounts for
the social science discoveries about how people make decisions about
personal data; (2) recognizing that people can engage in privacy selfmanagement only selectively; (3) adjusting privacy law’s timing to focus on downstream uses; and (4) developing more substantive privacy
rules. These are enormous challenges, but they must be tackled. Otherwise, privacy law will remain stunted while the problems it must
deal with grow larger and more out of control.

